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I. INTRODUCTION
Before the do-not-call list was established, the average consumer
could expect an unsolicited sales call every two to three days.' To give
consumers a way to avoid this problem, in 2003 the national do-not-call
registry went into effect, prohibiting telemarketers from contacting any
consumer who chose to register his or her telephone number on the list.
Registering for the list can be done over the phone or on the Internet,
literally taking less than one minute. This gave consumers the opportunity
to "opt-out" of receiving telemarketing phone calls on the condition that
they re-register their phone numbers every five years. The five-year
requirement would ensure that the number is still accurate and also that the
consumer wanted to remain on the list. Consumers nationwide did not
hesitate to jump at such an opportunity. By 2004, more than fifty million
phone numbers had been registered,2 with that number nearly tripling by
2007. 3 Despite, or more likely because of, the registry's popularity,
telemarketing firms across the country challenged its validity on the
grounds that it was an unconstitutional regulation of commercial speech.4
The Tenth Circuit has addressed the issue, holding that the regulation
adequately satisfied the narrow tailoring requirement in order to remain
within the bounds of the Constitution, and ultimately "[upheld] the do-not-
call list in its entirety,",5 resulting in millions of Americans cheering for
their privacy.
Fast forward to 2007; about the time fifty million Americans should
be thinking about re-registering their numbers on the list. The Federal
Trade Commission (FTC) released a statement pledging that it would no
longer require consumers to re-register their numbers every five years.6 The
bill was subsequently signed by the President and went into effect on
1. See, Mainstream Mktg. Servs., Inc. v. Fed. Trade Comm'n, 358 F.3d 1228, 1240
(10th Cir. 2004).
2. Id. at 1234.
3. FED. TRADE COMM'N, CURRENT Do NOT CALL REGISTRATIONS BY
CONSUMER STATE/TERRITORY (Sept. 30, 2007), http://www.fRc.gov/bcp/edu/microsites/
donotcall/pdfs/DNC-Registrations-10-05-20071.pdf (listing the total number of registered
numbers across the country at 145,498,656).
4. See, e.g., Mainstream Mtg., 358 F.3d at 1236 n.9 (explaining the First Amendment
challenge to the do-not-call list).
5. Id. at 1236.
6. See Press Release, Federal Trade Commission, FTC Pledges Not to Drop Any
Numbers From Do Not Call Registry, Pending Final Congressional or Agency Action on
Whether to Make Registration Permanent (Oct. 23, 2007), available at http://www.ftc.gov/
opa/2007/10/dnctestimony.shtm.
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February 15, 2008.7 On its face, this does not seem like a big deal, and
most people would not think twice about the potential constitutional
implications of the decision. However, when attempting to strike the
delicate balance between a consumer's right to privacy and the First
Amendment's protection of commercial speech, a seemingly trivial change
such as this has serious constitutional repercussions.
Section II of this Note explores the origins of the national do-not-call
registry-dating back to 1991-and examines each step of the process that
brought about the registry. Section III takes a close look at the Tenth
Circuit case of Mainstream Marketing Services v. Fedral Trade
Commission,8 with an eye toward the test used to determine the
constitutionality of commercial speech regulations that was elucidated in
Central Hudson Gas & Electric Corp. v. Public Service Commission.9
Section IV looks at the FTC's proposal to abolish the five-year re-
registration requirement and reexamines the constitutional analysis of the
do-not-call registry in light of Congress's decision to let numbers
permanently remain. This Note concludes by explaining that if the FTC
fails to offer more information justifying its decision to remove the re-
registration requirement, the do-not-call registry should not pass another
constitutional challenge.
II. THE BEGINNING OF THE NATIONAL Do-NOT-CALL REGISTRY
A. Telephone Consumer Protection Act
In 1991, Congress adopted the Telephone Consumer Protection Act
(TCPA).'0 The TCPA was created to adopt "reasonable restrictions on
automated or prerecorded calls to businesses as well as to the home,
consistent with the constitutional protections of free speech."" It prohibited
any person within the U.S. from: (1) making a call using any automated
telephone dialing system or an artificial or prerecorded voice to an
emergency line, hospital room (or other similar establishment), or any
number for which the called party is charged for the call;12 (2) calling any
residential telephone line using an artificial or prerecorded voice without
7. Do-Not-Call Improvement Act of 2007, Pub. L. No. 110-187, 122 Stat. 633
(codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 6101 note, 6151-6155).
8. 358 F.3d 1228 (10th Cir. 2004).
9. 447 U.S. 557 (1980).
10. Telephone Consumer Protection Act of 1991, 102 Pub. L. No. 243, 105 Stat. 2394
(codified as amended at 47 U.S.C. § 227 note (2000)).
11. Telephone Consumer Protection Act § 2(15).
12. 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(1)(A). It is important to note that this includes mobile and
cellular telephones, exempting them from commercial solicitations regardless of whether or
not the number is registered on the do-not-call list.
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the prior express consent of the called party; 13 (3) sending any unsolicited
advertisement to a telephone facsimile machine; 14 or (4) simultaneously
engaging two or more telephone lines of a multi-line business with the help
of an automatic telephone dialing system."
The TCPA charged the Federal Communications Commission (FCC)
with prescribing regulations to implement these requirements.16 The TCPA
also authorized the FCC to establish and operate, if necessary, a "single
national database to compile a list of telephone numbers of residential
subscribers who object to receiving telephone solicitations."' 7 The FCC,
however, did not find a national do-not-call list necessary at that time.
Rather, the FCC felt that maintaining company-specific do-not-call lists
was "the most effective and efficient means to permit telephone subscribers
to avoid unwanted telephone solicitations.", 18 The company-specific method
required a company to keep a list of individuals who have requested not to
be contacted for ten years. While other companies remain free to contact
the individual, the company that received the request is prohibited from
calling.
B. Telemarketing Consumer Fraud and Abuse Prevention Act
After recognizing that consumers and others lose an estimated $40
billion a year due to telemarketing fraud in addition to the countless other
forms of telemarketing deception and abuse, Congress decided to enact
legislation that would offer consumers protection from such fraud,
deception, and abuse.' 9 In 1994, Congress passed the Telemarketing
Consumer Fraud and Abuse Prevention Act (TCFAP).20 The TCFAP
directed the FTC, which was created to prevent unfair competition in
commerce, 2 1 to define "deceptive telemarketing acts or practices, ''22 and
then to prescribe rules prohibiting deceptive and other abusive
telemarketing acts or practices.23
13. Id § 227(b)(1)(B).
14. Id. § 227(b)(1)(C).
15. Id. § 227(b)(1)(D).
16. Id. § 227(b)(2).
17. Id. § 227(c)(3).
18. Rules and Regs. Implementing the Tele. Consumer Prot. Act of 1991, Report and
Order, 7 F.C.C.R. 8752, 8765 (1992).
19. See 15 U.S.C. § 6101 (2000).
20. Pub. L. No. 103-297, 108 Stat. 1545 (1994) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§
6101-6108 (2000)).
21. See Fed. Trade Comm'n, Facts for Consumers: A Guide to the Federal Trade
Commission (2004), http://www.ftc.gov/bcp/edu/pubs/consumer/generalgen03.shtm#bcp.
22. 15 U.S.C. § 6102(a)(2).
23. See id. § 6102(a)(1).
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Congress granted the FTC broad authority pursuant to the TCFAP but
recommended four components for inclusion in the rules. First,
telemarketers should be prohibited from undertaking a pattern of
unsolicited telephone calls which the consumer would consider coercive or
abusive.24 Second, unsolicited telephone calls should be restricted to certain
hours of the day and night.25 Third, telemarketers for the sale of goods or
services must "promptly and clearly" disclose to the consumer the nature
and purpose of the call.26 Finally, any telemarketer soliciting charitable
contributions or donations should also "promptly and clearly" disclose the
nature and purpose of the call.27 Additionally, Congress suggested that the
FTC consider recordkeeping requirements.28
C. Telemarketing Sales Rule and the Do-Not-Call Implementation
Act
In 1995, pursuant to the TCFAP, the FTC adopted the Telemarketing
Sales Rule (TSR).29 The salient portions of the TSR requires telemarketers
to clearly disclose: (1) the costs of the subject of the sales offer; (2) all
material restrictions, limitations, or conditions of the sales offer; (3) the
seller's refund, cancellation, and exchange policy; (4) the details of any
prize promotion, including the odds of winning, that no purchase is
necessary, how to participate without making a purchase, and any costs or
conditions necessary to receive a prize.30 Telemarketers were also
prohibited from misrepresenting costs, restrictions, or performance of the
goods or services being offered.3 1 The TSR listed a number of abusive acts
or practices that were also prohibited, including violating a company-
specific do-not-call list.32 Finally, the TSR restricted the hours during
which telemarketers may call consumers to 8:00 a.m. to 9:00 p.m. local
time at the called person's location.33
By 2002, both the FCC and FTC were unhappy with the rules
implemented in the 1990S. 34 The FCC, noting that telemarketing practices
24. Id. § 6102(a)(3)(A).
25. Id. § 6102(a)(3)(B).
26. Id. § 6102(a)(3)(C).
27. Id. § 6102(a)(3)(D).
28. Id. § 6102(a).
29. 60 Fed. Reg. 43842 (Aug. 23, 1995) (codified as amended at 16 C.F.R. pt. 310
(2008)).
30. Id. § 310.3(a)(1).
31. Id. § 310.3(a)(l)(iv)-(v).
32. Id. § 310.4(b)(1)(ii); see generally § 310.4(a)-(b).
33. Id. § 310.4(c).
34. See generally Rules and Regs. Implementing the Tel. Consumer Prot. Act of 1991,
Notice of Proposed Rulemaking and Memorandum Opinion and Order, 17 F.C.C.R. 17459
(2002); Telemarketing Sales Rule, 16 C.F.R. pt. 310.
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had changed significantly since 1992, 35 proposed to amend the rules made
pursuant to the TCPA.36 Less than a year later, the FCC adopted new rules
establishing the national do-not-call registry to be maintained by the FTC,
set a maximum rate on the number of abandoned calls, required
telemarketers to transmit caller ID information, and modified the facsimile
advertising requirements.37 Similarly, the FTC adopted amendments to the
TSR which supplemented the company-specific do-not-call provision with
a national do-not-call list maintained by the FTC.38 While Congress had not
yet authorized the FTC to maintain a national do-not-call list, Congress
granted that authority immediately after the FTC's authority was
challenged in court.39 Consumers who previously had registered on the do-
not-call list could still receive calls from any specific seller by granting
express written permission. 40 Likewise, an exception was carved out for a
telemarketer who was calling on behalf of a seller who had an "established
business relationship" with the consumer.41 Members would remain on the
list for five years, at which time the number would have to be re-registered
to ensure both that the individual still owned the line and that he or she
wished to remain on the list.
III. FIRST AMENDMENT PROTECTION OF THE Do-NOT-CALL
REGISTRY: MAINSTREAM MARKETING SERVICES V. FTC
By its nature, the do-not-call registry restricts only commercial sales
calls, and thus is a regulation of commercial speech. 2 First Amendment
protection afforded to commercial speech does not rise to the level given to
noncommercial speech.43 "[F]ailure to distinguish between commercial and
noncommercial speech 'could invite dilution ... of the force of the First
Amendment's guarantee with respect to [noncommercial] speech."'"
Commercial speech, therefore, is protected from unwarranted governmental
35. Rules and Regs. Implementing the Tel. Consumer Prot. Act of 1991, Notice of
Proposed Rulemaking and Memorandum Opinion and Order, 17 F.C.C.R. 17459, para. 1.
36. Id.
37. See Rules and Regs. Implementing the Tel. Consumer Prot. Act of 1991, 68 Fed.
Reg. 44,144 (July 25, 2003) (codified as amended at 47 C.F.R. pts. 64 and 68).
38. See Telemarketing Sales Rule, 16 C.F.R. pt. 310.
39. See Rules and Regs. Implementing the Tel. Consumer Prot. Act of 1991, Annual
Report on the Nat ' Do-Not-Call Registry, 19 F.C.C.R. 24002, para. 5 (2004) [hereinafter
Annual Report] (discussing Congress's swift actions to overrule the decision of United
States v. Fed. Trade Comm'n, 282 F. Supp. 2d 1285 (W.D. Okla. 2003)).
40. Telemarketing Sales Rule, 16 C.F.R. pt. 310.
41. Id.
42. See Mainstream Mktg. Servs., Inc. v. Fed. Trade Comm'n, 358 F.3d 1228, 1233
(10th Cir. 2004).
43. See Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Ass'n, 436 U.S. 447,463 n.20 (1978).
44. Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 557, 563 n.5
(1980) (quoting Ohralik, 436 U.S. at 456) (internal notation omitted).
[Vol. 61
THE DO-NOT-CALL REGISTRY
regulation by the First Amendment as applied to the states through the
Fourteenth Amendment.45
The interests of American citizens are served only if they are well
informed, and "the best means to that end is to open the channels of
communication rather than to close them." 46 Therefore, it would go against
the policy reasons behind the First Amendment to give the government
complete power to regulate commercial speech. For this reason, it is
important that commercial speech still receive First Amendment protection,
because "[c]ommercial expression not only serves the economic interest of
the speaker, but also assists consumers and furthers the societal interest in
the fullest possible dissemination of information." 47 It is this informational
function of advertising that is the basis for continued First Amendment
protection of commercial speech.48
On the other hand, for at least 400 years, a man's home has been
recognized as his castle and fortress,49 and as such, privacy within the home
has been enhanced by the common law and the Constitution.5° The
Supreme Court has worked to shape a right to privacy emphasizing the
importance of privacy within the home.5' The Court has referred to the
home as "a personal sanctuary that enjoys a unique status in our
constitutional jurisprudence. 5 2 The Court has held that the ability to avoid
intrusions is a special benefit that all citizens enjoy within their walls.5 3
Individuals, therefore, are not required to allow unwanted speech into their
homes, and further, the government may protect this freedom.54 The Court
has also added that "[t]he unwilling listener's interest in avoiding unwanted
communication . . . is an aspect of the broader 'right to be let alone."'
' 55
However, it is important that we do not use this right to be left alone within
45. See id. at 561.
46. Va. Pharmacy Bd. v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, 425 U.S. 748, 770 (1976).
47. Cent. Hudson, 447 U.S. at 561-62.
48. See id. at 563.
49. See Rodney A. Smolla, The "Do-Not-Call List" Controversy: A Parable of Privacy
and Speech, 38 CREIGHTON L. REv. 743, 747 (2005) (citing Semayne's Case, (1604) 77 Eng.
Rep. 194, 195 (K.B.)).
50. Accord United States v. Orito, 413 U.S. 139, 142 (1973).
51. See, e.g., Rowan v. U.S. Post Office Dep't, 397 U.S. 728, 737 (1970) ("The ancient
concept that 'a man's home is his castle' into which 'not even the king may enter' has lost
none of its vitality.").
52. Mainstream Mktg. Servs., Inc. v. Fed. Trade Comm'n, 358 F.3d 1228, 1233 (10th
Cir. 2004).
53. See Frisby v. Schultz, 487 U.S. 474,484-85 (1988).
54. See id. at 485.
55. Hill v. Colorado, 530 U.S. 703, 716-17 (2000) (quoting Olmstead v. United States,
277 U.S. 438,478 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting)).
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our homes as an excuse to ban constitutionally protected commercial
speech.
After the enactment of the national do-not-call registry, several
telemarketing companies sought to have the Act overturned on
constitutional grounds. In one ensuing case, the Tenth Circuit held that the
registry did not violate the First Amendment.56 The court explained that
"four key aspects of the do-not-call registry convince us that it is consistent
with First Amendment requirements. '57 First, it restricts only core
commercial speech. Second, it targets speech that invades the privacy of
the home. Third, it is an opt-in [opt-out]58 program, offering the choice of
whether or not to restrict calls to the consumers. Fourth, it materially
furthers the government's asserted interest. The Supreme Court
subsequently denied certiorari.59
After deciding that the speech in question was commercial speech, the
court in Mainstream Marketing used the four-part analysis set forth in
Central Hudson Gas & Electric Corp. v. Public Service Commission to
determine whether the registration passed constitutional scrutiny.60 For a
commercial speech regulation to pass constitutional muster, it must (1)
concern lawful activity, and not be misleading; (2) possess a governmental
interest that is "substantial"; (3) directly advance the state's interest; and
(4) not be more extensive than necessary to serve the asserted interest.6t
Before deciding the constitutionality of a specific commercial speech
regulation, it is necessary to determine whether or not the commercial
speech at issue falls within the First Amendment's protection. The
government may ban, without constitutional objection, any commercial
speech that is (1) more likely to deceive the public than to inform it, or (2)
related to illegal activity.62 Consider two extreme examples illustrating
commercial speech that would not fall within the protection of the First
56. See Mainstream Mktg., 358 F.3d at 1228.
57. Id. at 1233.
58. The court mistakenly refers to the do-not-call registry as an opt-in program, when in
fact the members of the registry are deciding to opt-out of receiving telemarketing calls. For
a better explanation of the difference between an opt-in and an opt-out program, see United
States v. Playboy Entm't Group, 529 U.S. 803, 841-42 (2000) (Breyer, J., dissenting). See
also Rules and Regs. Implementing the Tele. Consumer Prot. Act of 1991, 68 Fed. Reg.
44,144 (July 25, 2003) (codified at 47 C.F.R. pts. 64, 68) (explaining the decision not to
adopt an "opt-in" approach).
59. Mainstream Mktg. Servs., Inc. v. Fed. Trade Comm'n, 543 U.S. 812 (2004).
60. See Mainstream Mkftg., 358 F.3d at 1236-37. Perhaps because it is not at issue, the
court in Mainstream Marketing does not specifically address the first prong, and
subsequently refers to the analysis as a "three-part test governing First Amendment
challenges to regulations restricting non-misleading commercial speech that relates to lawful
activity." Mainstream Mktg., 358 F.3d at 1237.
61. Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 557, 566 (1980).
62. Id. at 563-64.
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Amendment. A person proposing to sell illegal drugs to another is not
considered lawful activity. This "commercial speech" does not receive any
First Amendment protection, and the Central Hudson analysis would cease
immediately. Similarly, a Web site posing as a charity soliciting donations
to help hurricane victims, when it is actually a college student trying to
supplement his beer fund, would be considered misleading. This
misleading expression would also fail to receive any First Amendment
protection, and likewise any further Central Hudson analysis would be
unnecessary.
In the second prong, the inquiry is whether the asserted governmental
interest is substantial. In Central Hudson, the Commission offered two
state interests, both of which were deemed substantial by the Court.63 The
first was the state's interest in conserving energy, and the second was the
state's concern that utility rates be fair and efficient. 64 While the Supreme
Court's definition of a "substantial interest" could require a law review
article of its own, suffice it to say that the definition is an arbitrary decision
that should take into account the totality of the circumstances, and will not
likely be at issue. In fact, there have been two cases decided by the
Supreme Court using the Central Hudson test since 2000. Both cases
skipped over the issue of whether the state's interest was substantial and
were decided only on the third and fourth prongs, presumably in an effort
to avoid articulating the standards to meet the "substantial interest"
requirement. 65 In an almost humorous attempt at avoidance, Justice
O'Connor's opinion in Thompson v. Western States Medical Center
explains the government's position that its asserted interest was substantial
before changing terminology and referring to the government interest as
"important. ' 66 She continues to find that the regulations, even assuming the
asserted interest was substantial and the regulations directly advanced that
interest, did not pass the fourth prong of the Central Hudson analysis.
67
This leaves one to speculate that a "substantial" interest lies somewhere in
between an "important" interest and a "compelling" interest;68 and further,
that the Court would rather overturn a regulation for some other reason
63. Id. at 568.
64. Id. at 568-69.
65. See Lorilard Tobacco Co. v. Reilly, 533 U.S. 525, 554 (2001) (stating that none of
the petitioners contest the importance of the state's interest); Thompson v. W. States Med.
Ctr., 535 U.S. 357, 371-73 (2002) (holding that the restrictions were more extensive than
necessary, even assuming, arguendo, that the government's interest was substantial).
66. Thompson, 535 U.S. at 368-69.
67. See id. at 374.
68. See id. at 368-69; Lorillard Tobacco Co., 533 U.S. at 564 (conceding that the
interest was substantial and going further to explain that it may even be compelling).
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than to take on the task of explaining why the asserted interest was not
"substantial."
The third and fourth prongs, which are only considered if the first two
inquiries "yield positive answers," focus on the relationship between the
state's interests and the regulation.69 The third prong requires the regulation
to directly advance the asserted governmental interest.70 For example, if the
state's asserted interest is in conserving energy, a ban on any advertising
that promotes the use of electricity would directly advance the state's
interest of energy conservation.7' The fourth prong requires that the
regulation be no more extensive than necessary to serve that interest.72
Using the example above, a complete ban might include suppression of
information about electric services or devices that would cause no net
increase in total energy use. While the regulation directly advances the
state's asserted interest, it may be more extensive than necessary by
regulating information that need not be regulated.73 The burden of proof lies
on the regulating body to show that a more limited restriction would not
adequately serve the asserted interest.
74
In Mainstream Marketing, the government asserted that its interests in
protecting the privacy of individuals in their homes, and protecting
consumers against the risk of fraudulent and abusive solicitations were both
substantial, and the court agreed.75 The court paid particular attention to the
importance of privacy in the context of the home, reiterating the sentiment
that "individuals are not required to welcome unwanted speech into their
own homes., 76 Moreover, in concluding that the interest in preventing
fraudulent and abusive sales practices was also substantial, the court
explained that "[t]he First Amendment... does not prohibit the State from
insuring that the stream of commercial information flows cleanly as well as
freely.1
77
The court succinctly summarized its position on the last two prongs of
the Central Hudson test in two sentences:
69. Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec., 447 U.S. at 566.
70. Id.
71. See id. at 569.
72. Id. at 566.
73. See id. at 570.
74. Id. ("In addition, no showing has been made that a more limited restriction on the
content of promotional advertising would not serve adequately the State's interests."); see
also Thompson v. W. States Med. Ctr., 535 U.S. 357, 373 (2002).
75. Mainstream Mktg. Servs., Inc. v. Fed. Trade Comm'n, 358 F.3d 1228, 1237 (10th
Cir. 2004).
76. Id. at 1237-38 (quoting Frisby v. Schultz, 487 U.S. 474, 484-85 (1988)).
77. Id. at 1238 (quoting Edenfield v. Fane, 507 U.S. 761, 768-69 (1993)) (emphasis
added).
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The do-not-call registry directly advances the government's interests
by effectively blocking a significant number of the calls that cause the
problems the government sought to redress. It is narrowly tailored
because its opt-in character ensures that it does not inhibit any speech
directed at the home of a willing listener.
78
Fortunately, more substance is given to these conclusions in the
following two sections of the opinion, giving us material to use when
looking toward the future.
The telemarketers argued that the do-not-call list was underinclusive
because it applied only to commercial calls, and did not apply to charitable
and political callers, thus seriously undermining its effectiveness. 79 The
court, however, explained that as long as the regulation materially
advanced the asserted state interest, underinclusiveness by itself would not
render the regulation unconstitutional.80 The court went on to explain that
commercial calls are the "most to blame" for the problem asserted by the
government.8 1 The number of complaints regarding unwanted commercial
calls is far greater than those regarding political or charitable
organizations.82 Furthermore, commercial callers bear more blame for
deceptive and abusive practices. This is seemingly due to the incentive to
engage in such practices when a purely commercial transaction is at stake.8 3
An average consumer who is not registered on the do-not-call list can
expect to receive 137 unsolicited calls per year.84 At the time Mainstream
Marketing was decided, more than fifty million telephone numbers were
registered, precluding more than 6.5 billion phone calls annually.85
Regardless of whether or not the list was underinclusive, the court found
that it materially advanced the government's goals--"reducing intrusions
upon consumer privacy and the risk of fraud or abuse"--by restricting calls
that cause these problems.86
The registry was held to be "narrowly tailored because it does not
overregulate protected speech; rather, it restricts only calls that are targeted
at unwilling recipients. 87 The court focuses on three main points in coming
to this conclusion. First, opt-out 88 restrictions are less restrictive than laws
78. Id.
79. See id.
80. See id. at 1238-39.
81. Id. at 1241.
82. Id. (referencing H.R. REP. No. 102-317, at 16 (1991)).
83. See id.
84. Id. at 1240.
85. Id.
86. Id. at 1241-42.
87. Id. at 1242.
88. For an explanation of the court's confusion of the opt-in/opt-out distinction in this
case, see discussion supra, note 58.
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that directly prohibit speech because the restrictions are based on an
individual's private choice. 9 Second, the registry only restricts one avenue
through which solicitors can communicate with consumers who have
registered for the list.9° Third, the telemarketers' proposed alternatives
could not serve the state's asserted interest with equal effectiveness. 9'
The court cites a plethora of Supreme Court cases holding that opt-out
restrictions are less restrictive than laws that prohibit speech directly,
including cases that have rejected direct prohibitions of speech on the
grounds that opt-in regulations would have been a less restrictive
alternative.92 Thus, the do-not-call registry does not itself prohibit any
speech, but rather it blocks "unwanted intrusions" into the homes of
consumers who have signed up for the list.93 To clarify, the registry
"permits a citizen to erect a wall . . . that no advertiser may penetrate
without his acquiescence. 94
Further, as illustrated by its name, the do-not-call list restricts only
one avenue by which solicitors and registered consumers can communicate.
Businesses can still solicit customers through advertising on roadside
billboards, through the U.S. Postal Service, television, radio, door-to-door,
or any medium other than the telephone. Also, consumers on the registry
are free to permit calls from any business with whom they want to
communicate. 95 Alternatively, consumers who choose not to register can
make company specific do-not-call requests with businesses from whom
they do not want to receive calls. 96 Thus, the personalization options
enhance the narrow tailoring of the do-not-call list.
The telemarketers offered two less restrictive and (what they
considered) equally effective alternatives: (1) continued use of the
company-specific lists, and (2) consumer reliance on technological
alternatives like caller ID, call rejection services, and electronic devices
designed to block unwanted calls. 97 The court quickly dismissed the latter
argument because it put the cost of avoiding unwanted telemarketing calls
on consumers.98 The court also offered a number of reasons why the
89. Mainsteam Mktg., 358 F.3d at 1242.
90. Id. at 1243.
91. Id. at 1244.
92. Id. at 1243. See e.g., Rowan v. U.S. Post Office Dep't, 397 U.S. 728, 729-30, 738
(1970); Martin v. City of Struthers, 319 U.S. 141 (1943); United States v. Playboy Entm't
Group, Inc., 529 U.S. 803, 815 (2000).
93. Mainsteam Mtag., 358 F.3d at 1243.
94. Id. (quoting Rowan, 397 U.S. at 738).
95. See id. at 1243-44.
96. See id. at 1244.
97. See id. at 1244-45.
98. Id. at 1245 (10th Cir. 2004).
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company-specific lists were inadequate. The company-specific rules were
"extremely burdensome to consumers," because they had to repeat their
requests to each individual solicitor.99 Also, after making a company-
specific request, consumers had no way to ensure that their numbers had
been removed from the calling list.' °° In fact, consumers' requests to be
placed on company-specific lists were often ignored by solicitors.' °' The
company-specific rules were also difficult to enforce because consumers
were forced to bear the burden of keeping detailed lists of which
telemarketers had contacted them, and on which company-specific lists
they had chosen to be placed.
0 2
After analyzing these two points, the court explained that "[n]o calls
are restricted unless the recipient has affirmatively declared that he or she
does not wish to receive them."'' 0 3 In October 2007, the FTC vowed to let
registration become permanent, thus leaving numbers on the list regardless
of whether or not they had been re-registered in the last five years. This
decision leaves us to answer the question, is the court's conclusion that no
calls are restricted unless the recipient has explicitly confirmed that he or
she does not wish to receive them still true when numbers remain on the
list permanently after originally being registered?
IV. THE 2008 AMENDMENT TO THE Do-NOT-CALL REGISTRY
A. The Do-Not-Call Registry and Its Subsequent Amendment
When the national do-not-call registry was first introduced in 2003,
the FTC recognized that sixteen percent of all telephone numbers change
each year, and twenty percent of Americans move each year.1°4 Thus, the
FTC concluded that it would be necessary to implement two measures to
counteract the potential problem that the registry would, over time, include
numbers that had been reassigned even though the new subscribers might
not object to receiving telemarketing sales calls.'0 5 First, the FTC would
periodically check all numbers in the registry against national databases
and remove from the registry any numbers that had been disconnected or
reassigned. Second, the FTC would require those who wished to remain on
the registry to re-register their numbers every five years. This second
requirement would ensure that the registered citizens still have the same
99. Id. at 1244.
100. See id.
101. See id.
102. Seeid.
103. Id. at 1245.
104. See Telemarketing Sales Rule, 68 Fed. Reg. 4580, 4640 (Jan. 29, 2003) (to be
codified at 16 C.F.R. pt. 310).
105. Seeid. §310.
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phone number and that they continue to prefer not to be contacted by
commercial telemarketers.'°6
In October 2007, the FTC proposed to amend the TSR to remove the
re-registration requirement. Less than four months later, the President
signed the Do-Not-Call Improvement Act of 2007,107 which eliminated the
automatic removal of telephone numbers registered on the national do-not-
call registry. The FTC will continue to periodically check the numbers
against a database that lists all numbers that have been disconnected or
reassigned. However, they will only remove numbers from the list that
have been both disconnected and reassigned, letting numbers that have
simply been disconnected remain on the list.'08
In the amendment's early stages, neither the FCC nor the FTC offered
much information in its support. Unfortunately, Congress passed the
amendment despite this lack of information. If sufficient information does
not surface shoring up any doubts or questions, the battle over the
constitutionality of the registry's commercial speech regulations may be
much tougher than both commissions expect.
B. Constitutional Analysis of the 2008 Amendment
The analysis of the first three prongs of the Central Hudson test will
remain unchanged and not likely be at issue when reconsidering the
analysis under the new law. The dispute will turn on the fourth prong:
whether the regulation is more extensive than necessary to serve the
asserted governmental interest. Restricting only calls directed at consumers
who have stated a preference to avoid them seems to be the quintessential
definition of narrow tailoring. The decision in Mainstream Marketing
operates under the broad assumption that "[n]o calls are restricted unless
the recipient has affirmatively declared that he or she does not wish to
receive them.'tl9 While this may have been a fair assumption at the time,
without keeping the database up to date by requiring users to re-register
every five years it seems that this assumption is no longer a foregone
conclusion.
106. See id. § 310.
107. Pub. L. No. 110-187, 122 Stat. 633 (codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 6101 note, 6151-
6155).
108. See Enhancing FTC Consumer Protection in Financial Dealings, with
Telemarketers and on the Internet: Testimony Before the Subcomm. on Commerce, Trade
and Consumer Protection of the H. Comm. on Energy and Commerce, 110th Cong., at 10,
n.19 (2007) (statement of Lydia Parnes, Director, Bureau of Consumer Protection),
available at http://www.ftc.gov/os/testimony/071023ReDoNotCaURuleEnforcementHouse
P034412.pdf, [hereinafter Statement of FTC].
109. Mainstream Mktg. Servs., Inc. v. Fed. Trade Comm'n, 358 F.3d 1228, 1245 (10th
Cir. 2004).
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When reanalyzing the constitutionality of the do-not-call registry, the
same two rights remain at the forefront of the discussion: the First
Amendment protection of commercial speech and an individual's personal
right to privacy within his or her own home. Before the change, it was not
difficult to determine that the registry was narrowly tailored. It would
ensure that people who did not want to participate in the registry would
continue to receive telemarketing phone calls by removing numbers that:
(1) had failed to re-register in the last five years, (2) been disconnected, or
(3) been reassigned. After the proposed change, only numbers that had
been both disconnected and reassigned would be removed. The registry
essentially went from having three mechanisms ensuring that the list was
current and up to date to having only one. It would be quite surprising to
see a court conclude that this change does not affect the narrow tailoring
that the Constitution requires.
If numbers belonging to consumers who wish to remain off of the list
are not removed from the list, the inclusion of unwilling participants will
continue to grow. If people who wish to hear the commercial speech
offered by the telemarketers are denied this right, the list effectively turns
into a complete ban on commercial speech, which, according to Central
Hudson, would be unconstitutional. As explained in Central Hudson,
restrictions on commercial speech require that the same governmental goals
could not be achieved with a less restrictive measure.10 The registry has
proven successful by using a less restrictive alternative, namely requiring
members to re-register their numbers every five years. Thus, it would be
very difficult to argue that the government's goals could not be equally
achieved with a less restrictive alternative.
Additionally, it is important to compare the downside of the
amendment to the downside of leaving the regulation in its pre-amendment
status. In passing the amendment, Congress is completely relying on the
accuracy of the Commission's process of purging numbers. In the case of
an error, we face the possibility of withholding constitutionally protected
commercial speech from countless willing listeners. These people would be
denied their right to hear commercial speech without any say or even
knowledge of what they are being deprived of. An individual whose
number had inadvertently been left on the registry would be in the dark as
to why he was never receiving any telephone sales offers, and therefore
would not know how to remedy the problem. On the other hand, with the
five-year re-registration requirement intact, the potential downside is
merely that an individual will forget to re-register, and will be bothered by
an unsolicited commercial sales call. He will be reminded to re-register
when he receives a call that he was not anticipating and does not want.
110. Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 557, 564 (1980).
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Given the simple registration process, he can quickly and easily be back on
the list for another five years. In addition to troubling only one consumer at
a time, each consumer is aware of the situation, knowing both that they
forgot to re-register, and the process to follow in order to get his or her
name back on the list. A simple balance shows that denying a potential
mass of innocent people the opportunity to hear constitutionally protected
speech in one fell swoop is far greater than the possibility that one
individual consumer will be inconvenienced by a telemarketer, reminding
him or her to re-register on the do-not-call list.
In the event of a mistake in purging obsolete numbers, the five-year
re-registry serves as a tool limiting the number of unknowing, innocent
victims who may be denied their right to hear commercial speech. Despite
the popularity of the registry, it is important to remember that not
everybody wishes to avoid calls from telemarketers.", With the re-
registration requirement in place, if a number that has been reassigned
accidentally remains on the list, telemarketers would only be prohibited
from contacting that individual for a maximum of five years. Assuming the
individual chose not to register, the number would automatically be
removed from the list within five years, and the consumer would be free to
receive the calls.
In the limited information offered to support the decision, the FTC
listed four changes that have taken place since the registry was first
established in 2003, only one of which is somewhat convincing. 112 First, the
FTC notes the increase in cell phone usage and popularity of number
portability. Second, both the Third and Tenth Circuit courts held that the
list was constitutional. Third, it is argued that the list has been implemented
successfully for five years and the process of removing disconnected or
reassigned numbers has been equally successful. The fourth reason offered
by the FTC is the unprecedented popularity of the registry. Moreover, the
FCC has concluded that the "enhanced consumer privacy protections
created by this proposed rule amendment, taken in conjunction with the
benefits to the federal government in administering the national registry,
outweigh any potential impact."
'
"
13
111. See, e.g., H.R. REP. No. 108-8 at 2 (2003) (citing a study that reports telephone
marketing generated $274.2 billion in sales in 2001 alone). See also Statement of FTC,
supra note 108, at 2 (citing a 2006 survey showing that 94% of American adults have heard
of the registry, but only 76% have signed up for it).
112. See Statement of FTC, supra note 108, at 9-10.
113. Rules and Regs. Implementing the Tele. Consumer Prot. Act of 1991, 72 Fed. Reg.
71,099, 71,101 (Dec. 14, 2007) (codified at 47 C.F.R. pt. 64).
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1. Changes in the Marketplace
In its statement that cell phone usage has risen and number portability
has become increasingly popular, the FTC neglects two important facts.
Many individuals have both wireless lines and wirelines. Moreover, in the
event of a move, regardless of an individual's desire to take his or her
telephone number along, the number is only portable if it remains in the
same area code.
When the do-not-call registry was created in 2003, the FCC estimated
that there were 118.1 million wireline residential telephone lines.'1 4 While
there has been some decrease in the number of wirelines, there were still
107.8 million wireline residential phone lines in 2005.15 Further, it is
difficult to see how this decrease in wirelines justifies precluding telephone
calls to consumers who potentially still want to continue to receive the
calls. Even if the number of wireline residential telephone lines were to be
cut in half, it would not reduce the need to protect an individual's right to
receive telemarketing calls if he or she so chooses. This can only be done
by ensuring that the registry contains only numbers that belong to
consumers who have affirmatively indicated a preference to take part in the
registry.
Of equal importance is the fact that regardless of the apparent
popularity of number portability, as far as the do-not-call registry is
concerned, a number is only portable as long as it remains within the same
area code. The most recent report of geographic mobility of Americans
considers the number of Americans who moved from 2002 to 2003. The
report shows that 14.2% of Americans moved in that year; nearly half of
those moves were outside of their previous county." 6 Of the movers who
decided to leave their county, only half decided to remain within their state,
while the rest left their state."' While some counties in rural areas share the
same area code, counties in more urban areas often have multiple area
codes. 118 The result of these moves was that people who chose to move out
of their county would almost certainly not be able to retain their telephone
numbers, and even some of those who remained in the same county would
also be forced to change numbers due to different area codes. Assuming
that every single person who moved within the same area code wanted to
keep his or her telephone number, it would still be highly unlikely that any
114. FCC, TRENDS IN TELEPHONE SERVICE (Feb. 2007), at 7-8, tbl.7.4, available at
http://hraunfoss.fcc.gov/edocsjpublic/attachmatch/DOC-270407A1 .pdf.
115. Id.
116. U.S. CENsus BUREAU, GEOGRAPHIC MOBILrrY: 2002 To 2003 (Mar. 2004), at 4,
tbl.B, available at http://www.census.gov/prod/2004pubs/p20-549.pdf.
117. Id.
118. For example, New York City alone has five area codes, Los Angeles County has
eight area codes, and Cook County, Illinois has eleven area codes.
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less than seven to eight percent of Americans per year would be forced to
change their phone number due to a move.
2. Legal Landscape
Next, the FTC argues that the legal landscape surrounding the do-not-
call list has become clearer.I9 In support of this argument, the FTC notes
its victories in two challenges to the registry's constitutionality. 120 While
this is undoubtedly true, this was only because the registry was deemed
"narrowly tailored" to achieve the goals of the government. The narrow
tailoring ensured that only those who voiced a preference not to receive
commercial telemarketing calls would actually avoid receiving such calls.
It would be illogical to conclude that because the registry passed
constitutional muster before, it would automatically pass again regardless
of any changes made to it.
The FTC correctly explains that the courts deciding the cases paid
close attention to the care the FTC put into ensuring that the registry
included only numbers of consumers who indicated a preference not to
receive the calls. 21 However, the FTC incorrectly claimed that the courts
did not address the issue of the five-year re-registration requirement. In
fact, in addressing the important features of the registry, the Tenth Circuit
explained: "[c]onsumer registrations remain valid for five years, and phone
numbers that are disconnected or reassigned will be periodically removedfrom the registry.,122 Simply because the court did not delve into the re-
registration requirement in its conclusion that the registry was narrowly
tailored does not mean that the requirement was not even considered in its
decision. To the contrary, the fact that the court specifically pointed out
that feature of the registry leads one to believe that it was in fact taken into
account upon rendering the final decision. In the case of another challenge,
the court will likely again focus on the issue of whether the registry
includes only numbers of consumers who have indicated a preference not
to receive commercial telemarketing calls, however, they may not come to
the same conclusion without the re-registration requirement.
3. Success of the Process of Purging Obsolete Numbers
While this argument is the FTC's strongest, the FTC will need to
elaborate on it in order to defeat another constitutional challenge to the do-
not-call registry. It is unlikely that the other three reasons offered for the
119. See Statement of FTC, supra note 108, at 9.
120. See id. at 10 n.18.
121. See id.
122. Mainstream Mktg. Servs., Inc. v. Fed. Trade Comm'n, 358 F.3d 1228, 1245 (10th
Cir. 2004).
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change will be enough to show that the change did not seriously undermine
the narrow tailoring required by the Constitution. Consequently, this is the
argument that will require the most detailed support. Even then, the FTC
may have to improve the process of purging obsolete numbers in order to
pass rigorous constitutional scrutiny.
The FTC explains that this process of purging numbers is
subcontracted to a list broker claiming to have information on every
telephone number in North America that is updated ten times daily.1 23 The
subscriber information, including disconnect and reconnect data, is
reportedly acquired from every local exchange carrier in America. 124 Once
a month, the broker matches the registry against its list of disconnected and
reassigned numbers and removes only those numbers that had been both
disconnected and reassigned.1
25
This highlights the questions that the FTC will face. Is the broker's
claim that its information includes every number in America verifiable? If
so, is it possible to verify that the information is always accurate and up to
date? Is it possible to verify that every number that has been reassigned will
be properly removed from the registry? Why do numbers have to be both
disconnected and reassigned in order to be removed? If the broker's
information does in fact contain every number in America, if it is always
accurate and up to date, and if any numbers that have been disconnected
and reassigned will be removed from the list every month, the question
remains as to whether this single measure is enough for the court to
conclude that the regulation is still narrowly tailored. Is removing numbers
once a month enough? Could the government's interest be served just as
effectively with an alternative that restricts speech less? Is the five-year re-
registration requirement needed as a safety net to ensure that any mistakes
do not last more than five years?
Unfortunately, neither the FTC nor the FCC has offered answers to
many of these questions, but the accuracy of the FTC's removal of obsolete
numbers is undoubtedly the issue on which any subsequent constitutional
challenge will turn. In order to pass rigorous constitutional scrutiny once
again, the FTC will need to show that its process of purging numbers is so
accurate that requiring members to re-register on the list would be
superfluous. The re-registration burden is minimal, requiring a quick visit
to a Web site or a call to a 1-800 number requesting registration. Complete
reliance on automatic removal of obsolete numbers surely removes this
burden from consumers. However, because the burden of re-registering is
123. Statement of FTC, supra note 108 at 10 n.19.
124. Id.
125. Id.
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so minimal, the court will likely find that any inaccuracy could not be
outweighed by the reduced burden on consumers.
4. Popularity of the Registry
It is difficult to see how the FTC can conclude that it is justified in
foreclosing a willing listener's ability to hear commercial speech simply
because a majority of the population chooses not to hear the commercial
speech in question. If seventy-five percent of Americans do not want to
receive commercial telemarketing calls, that does not diminish the right of
the other twenty-five percent of Americans that do want to hear the
constitutionally protected speech. 126 The registry's general popularity
among Americans does not give the FTC free reign to revoke the rights of
an individual who wants to hear the commercial speech offered by the
telemarketers. This is probably the weakest of the FTC's four arguments.
One could find that the registry's popularity actually cuts against the
need to amend it. The popularity of the registry illustrates two important
points. First, it shows that Americans are aware of its existence. Second, it
shows that registration is simple enough for ten million people to sign up in
the first three days127 and fifty million people to sign up within the first
year.128 This, in turn, demonstrates the minimal burden of registration. If
fifty million people can sign up in less than a year, it is hard to buy the
argument that requiring reregistration every five years is a burden too large
to impose on consumers who do not want to receive commercial sales calls.
V. CONCLUSION
After looking at the evolution of the national do-not-call registry, it is
apparent that the registry originated as a method to protect an individual's
privacy rights within his or her home. It required the individual to sign up
for the registry, and to reiterate his or her desire not to be bothered within
their home every five years. The recent changes, however, seem to take the
registry in the direction of gradually stopping commercial sales calls
altogether. The decision to abandon the five-year re-registration
requirement raises a number of serious questions regarding the future of the
registry.
As Americans, we greatly value our freedoms, particularly the
freedom of speech, and the freedom to be let alone. There is no doubt that
if an individual does not want to be bothered within his or her home, he or
126. See Id. at 2 (estimating that seventy-six percent of American adults have signed up
for the registry).
127. Annual Report, supra note 39, at para. 4.
128. Mainstream Mktg. Servs., Inc. v. Fed. Trade Comm'n, 358 F.3d 1228, 1245 (10th
Cir. 2004).
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she should be allowed that protection. However, we should not be so
forceful in protecting that right that we block another's right to speak, or
even hear speech that he or she so chooses. The registry has proven to be
extremely popular, probably due in some part to the ease of registration.
Considering the popularity, and the ease of registering (and re-registering,
for that matter) does it really seem broken? The answer to that question is
"no"; therefore, it does not seem that the registry needed to be repaired.
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